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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RUTH BUNKER HARDMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Oswald
C. Hardman, deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GAINES EDWARD THURMAN and
WOODROW W. DICKEY, doing
business as Dickey Woody Produce Company,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 7609

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a statutory action for damages by reason
of the death of Oswald C. Hardman on or about the
29th day of October, 1949. On said date at about the
hour of 9:00 or 9:30P.M. the plaintiff, Ruth Bunker
Hardman, wife of the decedent, was driving his autoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mobile, in which decedent with their small child was
also riding, south on State Street in Salt Lake City in
the lane next to the center of the street. State Street
north of 21st South has four lanes of paved highway ...
and has a gra veiled surface east of the east lane wide
enough for vehicular travel. South of 21st South
State Street has six paved lanes. The speed limit on
State Street south of 21st South is 40 miles per hour,
and the speed limit north of 21st South is 35 miles per
hour. As Mrs. Hardman entered the street intersection
she turned left to go east on 21st South, and _when she
had arrived at approximately the west line of the east
lane of 21st South her car was struck by the truck of
the defendant, causing the death of said Oswald C.
Hardman. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff
and this appeal is from the judgment entered on said
verdict.

POINTS RELIED UPON
1. Plaintiff negligent; defendants not negligent.
2. The court erred in permitting witness Brady
to testify as to· operation of brakes on truck and trailer
based on assumed facts of which there was no evidence.

(118)
3. The court erred in permitting witness Swigart
to give his expert opinion as to speed of truck ( 178,
18 9) when there was no basis in the evidence for such
testimo-ny.
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4. The court erred in permitting Witness Peterson to give hearsay testimony as to qualifications of
Oswald C. Hardman ( 19 9) .
5. The court erred in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict ( 2 9 0-2 91 ) .
6. The court erred in refusing to give defendants'
requested instructions:
(a) In refusing to- direct a verdict fot
defendants (Requested Ins. No. 1).
(b) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 2 that
if Thurman was not liable Dickey could not
be held liable.
(c) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 4 that
plaintiff's negligence must be imputed to Oswald C. Hardman, deceased.
(d) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 5 on
the issues of contributory and imputed degnigence.
(e) In refusing Requested Ins. No. 7
which was a proper statement of the law applicable to the facts under defendants' theory.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT NOT NEGLIGENT-PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF DEATH.
There were only three eye-witnesses to the accident, Daniel Lauriente, a witness for the plaintiff,
Wayne Parrish, the driver of a tanker, and Thurman,
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the driver of the defendants' truck. Lauriente was
talking to a friend at a point south of the intersection
and on the west side of State Street and first saw the
truck when it was 75 to 100 feet south of the intersection ( 10 3) and he estimated that its speed was 3 0 to
3 5 miles per hour ( 9 5) . He states that when the truck
entered the intersection the light was green and that
the light was still gre·en at the time of the collision
(97).
Parrish testified that when the light turned green,
he entered the intersection from the south in the lane
next to the center and proceeded to about the center
of the intersection with the purpose of making a lefthand turn west in to 21st South as soon as traffic from
the north had cleared, and while he was stopped, defendants' truck came by him on the right at a speed
of approximately 25 miles per hour when it struck the
Hardman car (225).
Thurman testified that he came into the street
intersection in the second lane, to the right of the Parrish truck, at a speed not exceeding 20 miles per hour
(236) and first saw the Hardman car when the front
end of it was approximately in line with the front end
of his truck (236). That he had no time or opportunity to turn either to the right or to the left to avoid
striking the car; that he did all he could to stop his
truck but was unable to do so and the truck struck the
right door of the Hardman car (Ex. B). Mrs. Hardman testified that she never did see the truck at any
time (219).
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The evidence is that th.e trailer on the defendants'
truck is 13 feet 2 inches in height (280); that there
were the usual headlights on the truck itself and also
lights on each corner of the trailer ( 2 3 8) .
There is no dispute that when defendants' truck
entered the street intersection the light was green ( 96,
235, 23 7). It was green even at the time of the impact
(97, 104) and the driver could not be guilty of negligence unless he was exceeding the speed limit. There
are no facts upon which the plaintiff can possibly
invoke the doctrine of last clear chance because there
is no evidence that the truck driver saw, or that by the
exercise of reasonable care he should have seen, the
plaintiffs car in time to avoid the collision. He
did not see plaintiff's car until "it was right in front
of me" (236). He had hardly time to get on the
brakes (23 7). Defendants' negligence, therefore, if
they were negligent, must depend on whether, just before and at the time of the impact, the truck was being
driven at an excessive speed.
What is plaintiff's proof as to the speed of the
truck? The only evidence she offered was that of witness Swigart, physics professor at the University, who
determined the speed by computation from certain assumed facts. Those assumed facts were that the friction coefficient at 21st South and State Street was .83,
determined by an experiment made by officer Yo·ungberg in an automobile with good brakes, by operating
it at 35 miles an hour and applying the brakes violently
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so as to lock the wheels. This experiment established
the coefficient. Then, accepting this coefficient, Swigart assumed in making his computation that the skid
marks of the truck with all wheels locked were 76 feet
in length, and therefore he computed the speed of the
truck at 42.6 miles per hour. He testified, referring
to his formula for the computation of the speed, that
he would assume that all wheels slid ( 167, 168). He
testified:
"What I said, I would like to say, making
the assumption that this vehicle is sliding on
all wheels through this distance, the 126 feet
given to me, we would have to subtract from
that the length of the truck; I believe you can
see why that is. If the wheels are suddenly
braked the back wheels start to make skid
marks back of the truck, and if we are having
all wheels skid the final skid would not be
from the front of the truck, not the entire mass,
it would be the distance minus the length of
the truck, 126 minus 50 would be 76 feetif that is assumed it is sliding-well I can work
the problem using that figure or use any distance the figure might show.'' ( 17 8)
Again:
~'Now

I want to be clearly understood
when I make that calculation to make that
statement, I have taken data on coefficient of
friction .8 and I have made the assumption that
the truck is sliding for a distance of 7 6 feet. I
am not sa.ying that I know definitely his speed
was this and again I figure in here from data
I have not taken. In all from that understandSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing that will give a calculated speed of about
42.6 miles per hour." ( 189)
As he states he had not himself taken the data, he
had assumed as correct data given him in the questions
propounded and, he testified, his conclusions are no
better than the data upon which they were based
( 19 5). So we must ascertain whether th.e evidence
shows that the truck wheels were locked and that the
truck slid for 7 6 feet.
Thurman, the truck driver, states that it was impossible to lock the wheels of the· truck and trailer when .
loaded (243) and this truck was loaded when the accident happened (284, 289).
· Clarence E. Brady, deputy sheriff, states that he
held the tape while he and William M. Clark, Police
Officer, made the only measurements that were made
of any tire marks, and Brady says that the only measurements made by Clark and himself were from the
point of impact to where the Hardman car came to
rest ( 115, 116). That that measurement was only of
the mark left by the left front tire of the truck ( 113).
He states that the trailer marks were the heaviest south
of the point of impact and that Exhibit 2 shows these
marks ( 125), but that he could not testify from the
skid mark which he saw whether all the wheels of the
unit were skidding from the farthest point south to
where the truck came to rest ( 114, 115). He says he
did not check the rear tractor wheels of the truck
( 115). He didn't make any cl1eck of the tires to see
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whether all had been slid ( 115, 116). That from the
point of impa~t to where the Hardman car came to
rest
"we only measured one skid mark. That is the
only one I recall. I never looked for any others.
I didn't look for them and I certainly can't testify that I did. I only saw one skid mark. That
is the one Officer· Clark and I measured. That
is from the point of impact to where the car
came to rest. The heaviest marks are up to
that." ( 116)
On cross-examination he testified:
· HQ. The only brake marks you observed
at the time from the point of impact north to
where the truck came to a stop was the one left
by the left· front wheel?
''A. That is correct.
"Q. And if there was one by the right
wheel you didn't see that?
HA. I didn't see that." ( 119)
Again:

I

HQ. You say the trailer tire left some
rather heavy marks?
''A. y es, str.
.
~~Q. Can you describe those as to their
width and color and density?
~~A. No. sir. I was not the investigating
officer. I was just holding the tape measuring
the slide mark. I didn't investigate any mark,
merely took measurements. I was just assisting Officer Clark in his investigation." ( 121)
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Officer Clark testified that the marks made by
the truck commenced 57 feet south of the south curb
of '21st South ( 131) and from that point to the point
of impact was 81.7 feet (143). The truck was 50.3
feet in length ( 144) which would give a distance of
30.4 feet the truck traveled as shown by the marks
until it struck the Hardman car ( 15 2). He testified
that the brake marks did not show the same constant
density.
"They were a discoloration, that is .they
weren't dark brake marks like you leave by
skidding a car but there was a definite difference between those marks and the ·surface they
covered or traveled over.
"Q. You say they weren't a dark black
mark like you usually see when you examine
brake marks?
"A. They were not a real dark black, no,
.
s1r.
"Q. Will you state that brake marks leave
a black mark on the surface?
"A. That is my understanding." ( 149)
He again stated that the marks he saw were not like
the usual bla~,k. brake marks ( 154) ; that he did not see
the brake ma~rks as they appeared on Exhibit No. 1
(156); that the water marks as shown by the dark
surface were quite distinct and that the dark marks
shown on Exhibit 2 were made by water ( 157).
The court will observe that Exhibits 1 and 2,
which fairly represent the appearance of the highway
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the time ( 15 5), show no marks indicating a skidding of the truck or trailer wheels when locked and the
same may be said of Exhibit C. The fact is, as stated
by Thurman, that he had no time to apply the brakes
to make the truck and trailer skid, if it had been possible to do so (and he states that.was not). The conclusion is justified that as soon as he saw the Hardman
car, he retarded his speed as much as possible but could
not and did not lock the wheels and therefore left no
skid marks; that his speed was so reduced that with
'his heavy load he pushed the Hardman car only about
45 feet (Ex. A).
In view of this evidence what ;effect ~can be
given to the testimony of expert Swigart as to the
speed of the truck? He made his computation on the
assumption that the wheels of the truck and trailer
were locked and slid for a distance of 76 feet but there
is no evidence to support such assumption so his testimony was incompetent and without probative value.
Assuming, then, as we must, that there is no competent
evidence whatever that the truck was exceeding the
speed limit when it entered or while crossing the street
intersection, what basis can there be for any claim of
negligence when it is undisputed that alf J the truck
entered the street intersection o-n a green light and that
after entering it his vision of the intersection was obstructed by the tanker which had stopped in th.e center,
and by the car preceding in front and to the left of him
in lane No.2 (260), so that he had no chance \vhatever to avoid colliding with the Hardman car? If the
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driver of the truck was at all times within his rights
and did not in any particular violate any rule of the
road, either by speed or otherwise, and if, as appears
from the evidence, the plaintiff made a left turn across
the lane of ttavel of the truck where she had no right
to be, her negligence was the proximate cause of the
fatality.
It was plaintiff's duty when she intended to turn
left to yield the right of \Vay to defendants' truck
which was proceeding north on the green light. Yet
she says she never saw the truck, which is conclusive
proof that in making the left turn she did not keep a
proper lookout for northbound traffic, for the truck
was so close when it entered the intersection on the
green light as to constitute an immediate hazard. The
language used in French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., _____ _
Utah ________ , 216 Pac. (2d) 1002, should be controlling
here. Justice La timer declared:
"When a statute _prescribes that a turning
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to another
on a straight-of-way when the latter is close
enough to constitute a hazard, it anticipates the
exercise of reasonable judgment on the part of
the driver turning. However, a burden is placed
on the driver making the turn as he has control
of the situation, and if there is a reasonable
probability that the movement cannot be made
in safety then the disfavored driver should yield.
The driver proceeding straight ahead has little
opportunity to know a vehicle is to be turned
across his path until the movement is commenced and in many instances, the warning is
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too late for the latter driver to take effective
action. This is apparently what happened in
this case. Plain tiff elected to run the risk of
clearing ahead of the on-coming truck which
was so close that even though it was moving
at a reasonable rate of speed a collision could
not be avoided. In so doing, he met with his
mishap and his negligence contributed to his
injury and prohibits his recovery.''
Plain tiff testified that she stopped after entering
the intersection when the front of her car was halfway
between the ·pedestrian lane and the semaphore (Tr.
211-212) . While so stopped two or three cars proceeded north; one northbound signalled to turn left
and stopped, then a tan car going north stopped immediately east and parallel with the car which was sig ..
nailing to go west (Tr. 212). Then it was, after having waited for such disposition of the traffic, that
plaintiff shifted into low and proceeded east at five
miles per hour ( T r. 216) and, although she looked
east and south sh.e never did see defendants' truck. She
did not even see the semaphore light as she turned east
(Tr. 217). She did not see the tanker driven by
Wayne Parrish (Tr. 218) althqugh it was headed
north in the inner lane and had stopped to make the
turn west (Tr. 224) and she proceeded east into the
far east lane of northbound traffic when, if she had
been on the lookout traveling at only five miles per
hour, she certainly would have observed the truck and
its 13-foot high trailer and could have stopped in time
to avoid being hit. How appropriate are the words of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Justice Wolfe in Ceder/off v. Whited, 110 Utah 45,
49-50, 169 Pac. (2d) 777, wherein the position of
the parties was reversed:
"If the jury found that defendant made
the turn very slowly in accordance with his testimony, then his negligence was the sole cause
of the collision. Had the driver of plaintiff's car
observed defendant slowly making the turn, in
accordance with defendant's testimony, he
would be justified in assuming that defendant
had seen his approach and would stop, as the
law required him to do, before entering the
northbound traffic lane, and to allow plaintiff's
car to pass. To drive in that manner would
be an invitation to the driver of plaintiff's car
to continue in his regular course and when defendant continued to crawl into plaintiff's lane
of traffic and failed to stop, as the law required
him to do, it would be too late to avoid the
accident by the time plaintiff's driver could discover that defendant was not going to stop.
Thus, as a matter of law, defendant's negligence
would be the sole proximate cause of the accident."
We submit that it affirmatively appears that the
plaintiffs conduct in failing to keep a proper lookout
and in failing to yield the right of way to the oncoming
truck of defendant establishes beyond question that her
negligence was the sole proximate caues of the accident,
and her negligence must be imputed to her husband as
he was the owner of the car and she was presumably
driving it at his direction.
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 Pac. (2)

1049.
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ERRORS IN RULINGS OF THE COURT
1. The court erred in permitting witness Brady
to testify as to operation of the brakes on the truck
and trailer.
Witness Brady was permitted to answer the following question:
''Assuming that the evidence in this case
then will show that the foot brake operates both
the tractor and trailer wheels, then an air brake
in proper functioning order would apply equally on all wheels, would it not?" ( 118)
No foundation had been laid for such question
and the answer was permitted on the basis that it
would be connected with evidence later to be introduced but which never was introduced. The evidence
in fact showed that there were two sets of brakes-a
foot brake for the truck and a hand brake for the
trailer (24 3).
2. The court erred in permitting witness Swigart
to give his expert opinion as to th.e speed of defendants'
truck ( 178-189). Witness Swigart testified that based
upon a coefficient .8 and the skidding with all wheels
o{ truck and trailer locked for a distance of 7 6 feet,
the speed of the truck was 42.6 m.p.h. As we have
heretofore shown, there was no evidence that all wheels
of the truck and trailer were locked or that they, when
so locked, skidded for 7(J ft. or at all (Tr. 187-188).
3. The court erred in permitting witness PeterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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son to answer questions as to discussions in directors
meetings as to the qualifications of Oswald C. Hardman. This evidence was pure hearsay ( 19 9) .
4. The court erred in denying defendants' Motion for a directed verdict for the reasons herein before
set forth (a) that there was no evidence that defendants were negligent; (b) that the evidence shows that
plaintiff was negligent, that her negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident and that her negligence
was imputable to Oswald C. Hardman (290-291).
ERRORS OF THE COURT IN REFUSING CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED
BY DEFENDANTS
1. Defendants' requested instruction No. 1, for
a directed verdict (38) should have been given. There
is no evidence upon- which the case should have gone
to the jury.
2. Requested instruction No. 2 (39) that if
Thruman was not liable Dickey could not be liable,
was also a correct statement of the law which defendant was entitled to have given.
3. Under the evidence and under the rule announced in Fox v. Lavender, 89 Ut. 115, 56 Pac (2d)
1049, defendants were entitled to have their requested
instruction No. 4 given, for obviously if decedent was
negligent, no cause of action for his death arose, and
as plaintiff's negligence was imputed to him, if she
was negligent, then plaintiff could not recover. PlainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that
plaintiff was driving the car at decedent's direction.
4. Requested instruction No. 5 ( 4 2) is a correct
statement of the law of contributory negligence and is
also applicable to the facts on the question of imputed
negligence under Fox v. Lavender.

5. What reason can possibly excuse the court
for refusing to give requested instruction No. 7? ( 45)
Certainly it was a correct statement of the law applicable to the facts, in line with defendants' theory, and
no other instruction was given covering the elements
· embodied in it.
6. Requested instruction No. 11 (51) is in accord with Sec. ~ 7-7-13 7, and defendants were entitled
to an instruction that it was not sufficient for plaintiff to say that she looked and did not see what obviously she must have seen if she had looked. Here
came the truck with trailer 13 feet in height, with
\lights on both. She was negligent if she failed to see
.lw"hat she must have seen if she had looked, and her
testimony was inherently erroneous because it was contrary to the physical facts. 2 0 Am. J ur., pp. 10 33-4.

7. Requested instruction No. 12 (52) excluding
from the jury's consideration the elements of deceased's
suffering and the element of sympathy or mental distress of plaintiff, was a proper instruction.

Corbett v. O.S.L.R.R.Co., 25 Ut. 449,
71 Pac. 1065.
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The only instruction touching this particular
element is instruction No. 15 (70) which does not
negative the consideration of the elements of mental
suffering or sympathy.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should
be reversed. There is exactly the same justification for
protecting a defendant from damages when he is not
liable as for awarding damages to the plaintiff when
he is entitled to recover.
EDWIN B. CANNON
REX J. HANSON,
ERNEST

F.

BALDWIN, JR.,

Attorneys for Appellant .
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